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AbstrAct
This paper examines several dimensions of inequality in theLatin American 
region focusing on top income shares and Gini coefficients, top wealth shares 
and the size wealth distribution. Itc ompares inequality of income according to 
household surveys and income inequality using tax data showing the former 
tends to underestimate top shares and gini coefficients and therefore the ex-
tent of inequality. The social structure is assesed for economic elites, the mid-
dle class and the working poor.
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resumen
Este artículo examina varias dimensiones de la desigualdad en la región 
de América Latina centrándose en los top income shares y los coeficientes de 
Gini, los wealth shares y la distribución de la riqueza. Se compara la desigual-
dad de ingresos en función de las encuestas a hogares y la desigualdad de 
ingresos a partir de datos tributarios, lo que muestra que, en el primer caso se 
tiende a subestimar las tasas más altas y los coeficientes de Gini y, por tanto, 
el grado de desigualdad. La estructura social se evalúa para las élites econó-
micas, la clase media y los trabajadores pobres.
Palabras clave: Desigualdad; Impuestos; Ingresos; Riqueza; Estructura social.
JEL codes: D63, I31, N36, O54.
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1. introDuction 
Inequality is certainly a very important topic. It involves basic issues of 
social justice and provides an indication of the extent to which the fruits of 
economic progress are fairly distributed (or not) among those who contributed 
to generate wealth. High inequality is also a concern in instrumental terms, as 
its has potentially adverse impact on economic growth, the degree of social 
cohesion and the probability of countries to experience economic and financial 
crises; inequality can also increase the incidence of corruption. Latin America 
stands as one of the regions with the highest levels of income inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficients and other distributive indices. The strong 
influence of economic elites and oligarchies in policy-making and their resist-
ance to progressive social change has been at the root of the persistence of 
Latin American inequality. 
Are these tendencies changing? Is inequality declining in Latin America? 
How do we measure economic inequality to gauge distributive trends? After 
the experience of the 1980s (the “lost decade”) and the 1990s (the years of 
the Washington Consensus) that led to rising inequality, the evidence provided 
by official household surveys for the period 2003-2012 points to a decline 
in income inequality in Latin America. This also corresponded to a cycle of 
booming terms of trade, higher GDP growth and also of more progressive so-
cial policies in various countries of the region. Thus, an “inequality optimism” 
developed among some analysts of the Latin American reality (Lopez-Calva 
and Lustig, 2010; Cornia, 2012; Tsounta and Osueke, 2014) that argued that 
the Latin American region would be, at last, in a path of lower inequality and 
better distribution of the benefits of economic growth among its population. 
From an international and comparative perspective, the presumed decline in 
the income Gini coefficients in the Latin American region would stand in con-
trast with the trend towards rising Gini coefficients observed in other main 
countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and other 
regions (Solimano, 2016).
It is important also to note, however, that the Gini coefficients, (calculated 
with data from household surveys), for several Latin American countries are in 
the range of 45-55 percent, quite high by international standards. Moreover, 
when the Gini are re-computed with tax data, the coefficients in some coun-
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tries are closer to 60 percent and higher.1 In turn, the wealth Gini are in the 
range 70-85 percent, confirming the presumption that wealth is often more 
unequally distributed than income. 
Since 2012-13 the Latin American region entered into a less favourable 
macroeconomic cycle of declining terms of trade and slower economic growth 
along with a more stringent fiscal position. In addition, in some countries new 
governments are leaning towards more orthodox economic policies. 
This paper examines the claims of declining inequality in Latin America in 
the 2000s and early 2010s, contrasting inequality indices based on household 
survey data with other indices using tax-data showing that inequality indica-
tors can be substantially higher.2 Thus, the claims of a substantial progress 
attained in the ‘battle against inequality’  may be premature. 3 The paper also 
reviews new empirical evidence based on personal net wealth (financial plus 
non-financial assets less debt) to assess trends in wealth inequality, an often 
under-researched dimension of economic inequality. In addition, we use vari-
ous indicators to examine the concomitant social structure in terms of eco-
nomic elites, the middle class and the poor. 
The document is organised in seven sections besides this introduction. 
Section 2 provides empirical evidence based on household surveys on the 
evolution of inequality in Latin America in recent decades, showing a de-
cline in the Gini coefficients in the period 2003-2012. Section 3 compares 
the levels of inequality in Latin America relative to the OECD and world av-
erages and  reviews recent country studies using tax data, mostly led by 
independent research teams in the region, that revise current estimates of 
top income shares and recalculate Gini coefficients. These studies show a 
picture of higher and stable inequality that differs from the story of a decline 
in inequality that emerges when using household data, qualifying the claims 
of declining inequality in Latin America in recent years.4 Section 4 brings evi-
dence on the distribution of wealth, using new data on net worth for different 
wealth classes in a large group of countries and section 5 examines evidence 
1 Regarding the income share of the top 1 percent, in advanced capitalist countries such as the 
United States the income share of the richest one percent of the population in national income is 
currently at about 22 percent, in the United Kingdom 15 percent and in France is 8 percent. In the 
Latin American region, Chile shows a record income share of 33 percent and Argentina 17 percent, 
Solimano (2014).
2 Household surveys data (HS) are more appropriate for analysing what happens at the bottom of 
the income distribution as they often tend to underestimate incomes at the top. This bias can, in 
principle, be ameliorated by computing the indices for the top deciles/centiles using income tax data 
that is considered less prone to understatement at the top, although practices of tax elusion and tax 
evasion render this method not completely problem-free either.
3 From an international and comparative perspective, the presumed decline in the income Gini 
coefficients in the Latin American region (according to Household Surveys) would stand in contrast 
with the trend towards rising Gini coefficients observed in other main countries such as the United 
States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and regions (Solimano and Calderón, 2016).
4 These studies generally follow the methodological framework of the World Top Income Database 
(WTID) project housed at the Paris School of Economics developed by economists Anthony Atkinson, 
Thomas Piketty, and Facundo Alvaredo among others. 
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regarding economic elites, the middle class and the working poor. The paper 
concludes in section 6.
2. the level of lAtin AmericAn inequAlity in compArAtive perspective 
Historically, the unequal distribution of wealth, in particular extensive piec-
es of land, along with financial and productive assets has characterised the Lat-
in American region. In turn, the distribution of Incomes (wages, rents, profits) is 
also quite skewed. To get a sense of the degree of Latin American inequality in 
international perspective table 1 compares, using summary Gini coefficients, 
the distribution of income (before and after correcting by taxes and subsidies) 
and the distribution of wealth in the Latin American region with those of the 
OECD and world averages.5 The results of the table highlight several important 
features of Latin American inequality:
a) The Gini coefficient for gross income is higher (more inequality) in 
Latin America than in the OECD and the world average.
b) Wealth distribution is more concentrated than income distribution in 
both, LAC and the OECD countries (higher wealth Gini than the income Gini). 
c) For the OECD group, there is a 15 percentage points difference be-
tween the gross income Gini and the disposable income Gini. This highlights 
the redistributive role played by taxes and transfers in this group of countries. 
In contrast, this difference is relatively small for Latin America (4 percentage 
points) and the world economy (0.2 percent).
d) The wealth Gini of Latin America is near 9 percentage points higher 
than the wealth Gini for the OECD but it is only slightly below the world aver-
age.        
tAble 1. inequAlity in lAtin AmericA, oecD, worlD (gini coefficients) c. 2008-2010 
 Gross income Disposable Income Wealth
OECD 46.8 31.6 71.7
Latin America 53.0 49.0 80.9
World 40.0 39.8 81.6
Note: Gini coefficients are simple averages within each category.
Source: Solimano (2016).
5Gross incomes correspond to market income plus transfers. Disposable income is gross income less 
taxes.  Net wealth is defined as the sum of financial assets (bonds, stocks, mutual funds, deposits) 
and non-financial wealth (property and other non financial assets), as calculated by the Global Wealth 
Report prepared by Credit Suisse report following a consistent methodology that makes the wealth 
levels and the Gini coefficients comparable across nations.
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Interestingly, the fact that the Gini of gross income is relatively similar to 
the Gini of disposable income in the LAC region suggests that the action of the 
State to correct this inequality through taxation and transfers is rather limited 
and ineffective. Explanations for this behaviour are associated with a moderate 
level of overall taxation (relative to GDP), heavily reliant on indirect taxation, 
with tax loopholes that benefit the rich or with less progressive spending of 
tax collection. Indeed, we can observe from figure 1 that within the OECD 
countries Mexico and Chile are the most unequal countries in both measures. 
figure 1. DisposAble income gini coefficients AnD top to bottom income shAres in the oecD by 
country, 2010.  
Source: Solimano (2016) based on the OECD Income Distribution Database (via www.oecd.org/social/
income-distribution-database.htm), 2010.
3. is income inequAlity reAlly Declining? eviDence from income tAx-DAtA 
stuDies
Independent studies of top income shares for individual Latin American 
countries using income data coming from tax records show higher income 
shares than those of household surveys and also higher values for the Gini 
coefficient.6 A recent study for Mexico, Esquivel-Hernandez (2015), supported 
by OXFAM, shows that the official Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y hogares, 
6 Atkinson (2007) provides a formula for calculating a corrected Gini coefficient when very rich 
individuals are effectively measured (say using income tax data although this measure, as already 
said, is not perfect). An underestimation of the income’s share of the very rich (say the top 1 percent 
or top 0.1 percent) leads to a discrepancy between measured Gini and “true” Gini coefficients. 
Alvaredo (2011) applies the Atkinson formula (with the top income share properly measured) for 
Argentina and the United States yielding to substantial increases in the Gini for the two countries.
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ENHIG, (a household survey) estimates in near 45 percent the income share of 
the top 10 percent; however, when using tax data and adjusting by the national 
accounts that share goes up to 60 percent. In addition, the study shows that 
the income share of the top 10 percent increased in the period 2002-2012 in 
contrast with the decline of around 7 percentage points shown by the official 
ENHIG estimates. The study shows that the income share of the top 1 percent 
in Mexico is near 21 percent, higher than the corresponding share for Colom-
bia, Argentina, the United States, Spain, China and other nations.  
For Chile, the World Bank prepared a study to evaluate the distributive 
effects of the tax reform of 2014 that provides useful information on inequal-
ity indices. For computing Gini coefficients and top income shares the report 
adopts the following two main methodological assumptions: (i) a combined 
method based on household-surveys information for the bottom of the dis-
tribution and tax records for the top segments and (ii) a distinction between 
cash income and accrual income (see Banco Mundial, 2015).7 The results show 
the high sensitivity of the distributive results to the income definition used for 
computing the indices. The lower Gini (0.50) is obtained when using household 
income per capita that is the standard unit of the CASEN (the main household 
survey in Chile) while the highest value of the Gini (0.68) is attained when 
personal income is measured on an accrual basis (including distributed and 
undistributed profits). In turn, the upper income shares are also substantially 
higher when using accrued personal income data. In fact, while the income 
share of the top 1 percent when calculated using personal income on current, 
unadjusted, income  is close to 14 percent, the share climbs to 33 percent 
when personal income is calculated on an accrual basis. The upward revisions 
for the top 5 percent and top 0.1 percent are equally substantial (see table 2). 
tAble 2. chile: gini coefficients AnD top income shAres (combineD methoDology), 2015.
Gini  top 0.1%  top 1 %       top 5 %
 Household income per capita 0.50      
Personal income (cash) 0.59 2.3 % 13.9% 36.6 %
Personal income (accrual) 0.68  19.5% 33.0% 51.5%
Source: Banco Mundial (2015). 
A study for Uruguay by Burdin, Esponda and Bagurito (2014) compares 
the top income shares obtained from household surveys with those using tax 
records at micro level (Table 3). The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 show 
a difference between 2 and 5 percentage points higher for the income share 
7 Diaz-Bazan (2015) proposes using an optimal income threshold for combining household surveys 
that are reasonably adequate for middle to bottom incomes with tax records that represent better 
higher incomes. The optimal threshold is the minimum mandatory income that triggers  tax filing.   
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of the top 1 percent based on tax records compared with the share based 
on household surveys. The Uruguay study shows that the value of the Gini 
coefficient calculated with income data from tax records is higher by 3 to 4 
percentage points than the Gini obtained from household surveys data. As it is 
displayed in table 3, when using tax-records there is no decline in the income 
share of the top 1 percent between 2009 and 2011 (rather a slight increase), 
contrary to what happens when using household survey data. 
tAble 3. uruguAy: gini AnD income shAre of top 1 percent (householD surveys AnD tAx-DAtA) 
                                          Income share top 1 percent                              Income Gini
Year Household survey (HS) Tax data (TD) HS  TD
2009 11.5 13.8 0.51 0.54
2010 10.2 14.3 0.49 0.53
2011 9.3 14.1 0.48 0.52
Source: Own elaboration based on Burdin, Esponda and Bagurito (2014).
For Brazil, Medeiros, Ferreira and Castro (2014) shows, using tax data, the 
relative constancy of the income’s share of the top 5 percent, top 1 percent 
and top 0.1 percent between 2006 and 2012 contrary to the view held of 
a decline of income inequality in Brazil based on evidence from the PNAD 
(the household survey elaborated by the Central Statistical Office, IBGE). The 
income share of the top 5 percent is around 47 percent, the share of the 
top 1 percent is 25 percent and the share of the top 0.1 percent around 11 
percent (for 2012). These numbers are high by international standards. The 
authors also computed a tax corrected Gini coefficient combining household 
data for the bottom 90 percent and tax data for the upper 10 percent of the 
distribution and come up with an upward adjustment of between 6 to 9 per-
centage points for the Gini putting it near 69 percent. Interestingly, while the 
PNAD- based Gini declines from 0.64 to 0,59 between 2006 and 2012 the tax 
corrected Gini remains virtually constant at 69 percent between those years, 
casting doubts on the alleged decline of income inequality in Brazil.
For Colombia, Alvaredo and Londono-Velez (2013) recalculates top income 
shares using income-tax information and compare the results obtained with 
those of household survey data. Their results show that the income share for 
the top 1 percent is around 20 percent (1997-2010) a figure on the high side 
compared with the group of countries of the World Top Income Database. In 
contrast, the income shares of the top 1 percent based on the household 
survey was 13.5 percent in 2010 with incomes corresponding, essentially, to 
rentiers and capital owners. Again, contrary to the claim that inequality has 
declined in Colombia, the study finds that income has concentrated at the top 
and the share of top percentile has remained stable rather than declining in re-
cent years. The authors also compute a corrected Gini using the income share 
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of the top 1 percent based on tax data and the rest using household survey 
information; because of these adjustments the corrected Gini is between 2 and 
3 percentage points higher than the household survey based Gini coefficient. 
Summing-up, these studies show that when calculating top income shares 
with tax data the results yield higher top income shares than those implied by 
household surveys and, also, higher and more stable (corrected) Gini coeffi-
cients therefore providing a different picture to the prevailing belief of a decline 
in overall inequality in Latin America in recent years.  
4. inequAlity of weAlth
Income and wage disparities are certainly important measures of economic 
inequality but they do not tell the full story on long run inequality. This con-
cept, in principle, can be approximated by looking at the level of wealth in-
equality. In fact, the net wealth of a person (or household) reflects better their 
life-time earnings (and savings) capacities and medium to long-run command 
of resources than current income flows. Marketable personal/household wealth 
(or net worth) is often defined as the sum of financial assets (stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds) plus non-financial wealth (housing, land and other asset) less 
personal debt.8
Table 4 presents the Gini coefficients for wealth for 11 Latin American coun-
tries as well North America, and other selected economies using the dataset 
of the Global Wealth Report published  since 2010, annually, by Credit Suisse 
(Shorrocks et al., 2015a and b).9 The wealth Gini coefficients in the Latin Amer-
ican countries, are in the range of 70-85 percent much higher that the range 
for the income Gini coefficient that is between 45 and 55 percent  (household 
surveys) and above for tax-based income Gini.10As mentioned before, Latin 
America had an unequal and highly concentrated pattern of land holdings (the 
latifundio system with origins in the Spanish colonization process) and this con-
tributed to generate an unequal pattern of wealth distribution. Now inequality 
in the holdings of financial assets and the ownership of physical capital account 
for most of the overall wealth inequality. 
8 This definition of wealth excludes rights to state pensions from a pay-as–go system since these 
rights are not traded in the market and therefore are difficult to measure in monetary terms. On 
the other hand, wealth definitions are starting to include private pension fund accounts, that are 
a growing component of personal wealth for the top 20 percent of the population in several high 
income countries (Solimano, 2016).
9 Comparable international estimates of wealth levels, through direct and indirect methods, for more 
than 120 countries are now available, including information for Latin American countries. Figures can 
be obtained from the Global Wealth Report (2015). The preparation of this report is overseen by 
international experts on on wealth Anthony Shorrocks, James Davies and Rodrigo Lluberas.
10 It is worth noting that in several Latin American countries lacking wealth surveys, the levels and the 
distribution of personal wealth are estimated through indirect econometric methods.
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tAble 4. weAlth gini inDex 2015 (percent): lAtin AmericA AnD selecteD countries
LAC  Other countries  
Argentina 81.8 Australia 63.9
Bolivia 71.3 China 73.3
Brazil 83 Canada 72.6
Chile 79.5 Denmark 89.3
Colombia 76.9 France 70.3
Ecuador 73.8 Germany 77.5
Mexico 75.9 India 83.1
Panama 80.2 Ireland 71.7
Paraguay 72.9 Italy 66.7
Peru 80.3 Japan 63.4
Uruguay 82.5 Norway 77.9
Venezuela 81.8 Russia 91.2
Regions  South Africa 84
Africa 85.6 Spain 67.1
Asia-Pacific 89.2 Sweden 80.9
Europe 83.4 United Kingdom 67.8
Latin America 80.9 United States 85
North America 84.2   
World 91.5   
Source: Own elaboration based on Shorrocks et al.  (2015)
It is interesting to note that, according to the Global Wealth Report data 
2015, the average level of wealth inequality in the Latin American region is 
below the levels of wealth inequality in Africa, North America (that includes 
Mexico), and the world average. Still this data has to be taken with caution as 
wealth is estimated indirectly for several Latin American and other developing 
countries (See Shorrocks et al. 2015a and b, for methodology).
 Gini coefficients provide aggregative statistics of inequality and we may be 
interested in learning more about the size distribution of wealth. A breakdown 
of the distribution of adults for four wealth ranges comprises the following 
ranges : (a) below U$ 10,000, (b) 10,000-100,000; (c) 100,000-1 million and 
(d) over 1 million. The data reveals that, on average, the bulk of the adults -72 
percent-- in the Latin American region has a net worth of less than 10,000 dol-
lars (the world average share in this bracket is 71 percent), with 26 percent of 
the adults having a wealth level in the range of 10,000-100,000 dollars and 
3 percent for the higher ranks. These figures suggest that the vast majority 
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of the Latin American population has modest levels of net worth in spite of 
the process of economic growth and rising per capita income that has taken 
place in recent decades in the region. At country level, Venezuela has the high-
est percentage –92 percent– of the adult population with net worth below 
10,000 dollars (followed by Bolivia with 88 percent). In turn, Chile has the 
lowest percentage of the adult population (48 percent) with wealth below US$ 
10,000, followed by Uruguay (54 percent). At the upper tail of the distribution 
of wealth, the percent of adults with net worth above one million dollars is the 
highest in Uruguay and the lowest in Venezuela and Bolivia (under-reporting of 
wealth at the top in some countries is a real possibility). As a comparative ref-
erence, in North America (that includes Mexico), the percentage of adults with 
net worth below US$ 10,000 is 27 percent, a figure much lower than in Latin 
America; in Europe the corresponding share is 44 percent. The highest concen-
tration of adults with wealth holdings above 1 million dollars in the world is in 
North America with 6.1 percent (table 5). 
tAble 5. percentAge of ADults by weAlth rAnge, 2015 (in %) Distribution of ADults (%) by weAlth 
rAnge (usD)
 under 10,000
10,000 - 
100,000
100,000 – 1 
million
over 1 million
LAC     
Argentina 86.6 12.5 0.9 0.1
Bolivia 88.7 11 0.3 0
Brazil 75.9 22.2 1.8 0.1
Chile 48 46.6 5 0.3
Colombia 64.6 32.6 2.7 0.1
Mexico 56.7 39.9 3.2 0.2
Paraguay 78.2 20.6 1.1 0
Peru 69.5 28.3 2 0.1
Uruguay 54.2 41.4 4.1 0.4
Venezuela 92 7.4 0.6 0
Other countries    
Canada 18.5 31.9 46.1 3.6
United States 28.1 32.9 32.6 6.4
Denmark 31.9 24.5 39 4.6
France 16.9 33.1 46.3 3.7
Germany 29.7 33.9 34.2 2.3
Ireland 18.8 35.3 43.5 2.4
Italy 12.4 37.6 47.7 2.3
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Norway 23.1 21.9 49.6 5.4
Russia 91.4 7.7 0.8 0.1
Spain 12.1 62.8 24.1 1
Sweden 15.8 47.4 29.7 7.1
United Kingdom 10 33.9 51.3 4.9
Australia 7.2 26.1 61 5.7
China 62.1 35.5 2.3 0.1
India 95.4 4.3 0.3 0
Japan 9 42.3 46.7 2
South Africa 72.7 24.3 2.9 0.2
Regions     
Africa 93.3 6.2 0.4 0
Asia-Pacific 74.3 17.6 7.7 0.4
China 62.1 35.5 2.3 0.1
Europe 44.7 30.7 22.9 1.7
India 95.4 4.3 0.3 0
Latin America 71.7 26.1 2.1 0.1
North America 27.1 32.8 34 6.1
World 71 21 7.3 0.7
Source: Own elaboration based on Shorrocks et al.  (2015)
5. the sociAl structure: economic elites, miDDle clAss AnD working clAss/
poor
The social structure of countries has changed in significant ways with the 
process of globalisation, the advent of new technologies, the adoption of free 
market policies, deregulation and privatisation. These trends have affected 
also the Latin American region. We can identify at least three main features 
of the social structure in the age of globalisation and neoliberalism (Solimano, 
2014 and 2016):
(i) An increased importance of the economic elites and growing concen-
tration of income and wealth at the top.
(ii) In developing countries experiencing relatively robust growth there 
has been an increase in the absolute size of the middle class but also ac-
companied by increased segmentation between upper and lower middle class 
segments. In other countries, aggregate economic growth has co-existed with 
stagnant middle class incomes (e.g. USA). Although the middle class has ex-
panded in some regions experiencing faster economic growth this is also a 
vulnerable segment of the population. Three main sources of vulnerability can 
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hit the middle class (and the poor):(i) financial shocks and indebtedness, (ii) 
shocks in the labour market (unemployment and cuts in real wages) and (iii) 
health contingencies. 
(iii) There has been a decline in the economic importance and socio-
political influence of the traditional working class reflected in a fall in the la-
bour share in national income, stagnant wages and unstable jobs. These trends 
come along in a period of high mobility of capital to low wage countries, labour 
saving technical progress, lower labour union membership and influence and 
increased immigration from low to middle-income countries. 
5.1 the economic elites
We shall define economic elites as a small group that captures a large share 
of national income and owns the bulk of the main productive and financial 
assets in the economy (Solimano, 2014). In terms of the history of ideas, the 
concept of elites was developed, chiefly, by the “Italian school” of Wilfredo 
Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. Pareto (1991) envisaged elites as “people with 
exceptional qualities” and Mosca (in The Ruling Class) argued that the main 
source of power for the ruling class (elites) is their superior internal organiza-
tion, enabling them to “have a disproportionate influence over the vast major-
ity of society despite their numerically small group”.  The American Sociologist 
C. Wright-Mills, in The Power Elite (1956[2000]) expanded the concept of elites 
to include three segments: economic, political, and military that compose the 
“power elite” in the United States. In contrast, Karl Marx did not elaborate his 
theories based on the concept of “elites” but described the upper echelons 
of capitalism as dominated by a capitalist class that owns the capital of the 
economy and assumes a dominant position in the economy and society. 
 Statistical indicators of the economic power of elites (in terms of com-
mand of resources) are the income share and wealth share of affluent groups 
in society, say the top (richest) 5 percent, top 1 percent or top 0.1 percent of 
the population. Elites are important as they affect the process of capital accu-
mulation, the degree of market competition (through monopolistic practices) 
and the patterns of inequality in the economy. In turn, elites exert influence on 
the functioning of democracy through lobby activities, the financing of political 
campaigns, ownership of mass media, contribution to think-tanks and so on. 
In the Latin American region, the economic power of elites shifted mainly from 
their dominant position as landowners in the past to dominant positions in 
industry, finances, and natural resources ownership. 
5.2.  eviDence from top income shAres 
In a previous section, we presented estimates of top income shares for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay using tax data that are sum-
marised in table 6. The highest income share for the top 1 percent is found in 
82
Chile --between 31 and 33 percent-- using the most comprehensive definition 
of income, followed by Brazil, 25 percent and Colombia, 20 percent (period 
1997-2012). The share of the top 1 percent in Argentina and Uruguay is be-
tween 12 and 16 percent depending on the year under consideration. Accord-
ing to the World Top Income Database, the United States has a share above 20 
percent, the UK, 16 percent, France and Spain 8 percent, Portugal 9 percent, 
China 6 percent and the Scandinavian countries between 6 and 8 percent. In a 
comparative perspective, Latin American elites get a high share of income for 
them, suggesting a significant command on resources by the local elites. 
tAble 6. income shAre of the top 1 percent in selecteD lAtin AmericAn countries (tAx-bAseD 
informAtion)
 Percentage
 Argentina*  Brazil a Colombia* Uruguay* Chileb Mexicoc
1997 12.4 --- 20.85 --- --- ---
2004 16.75 --- 17.8 --- --- ---
2009 --- 25 20.17 14.2 33 ---
2010 --- 25 20.45 14.6 31 ---
2011 --- 27 --- 14.4 --- ---
2012 --- 26 --- 14 --- 21
Source: * World Top Income Database, Paris School of Economics, a: Medeira, Ferreira de Souza 
and Castro (2014), b: Fairfield and Jorrat (2014), López et.al. (2013) and Banco Mundial (2015), 
c: Esquivel Hernandez (2015).
Now if we turn to wealth shares for the top 10, top 5 and top 1 percent 
we find they exceed, substantially, the corresponding income shares confirm-
ing the fact that wealth is much more concentrated than income, particularly 
at the top of the distribution. The data of Credit Suisse for Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia (table 7) show the wealth share of the top 1 percent is 34 percent 
(Colombia), 43.2 percent (Chile) and 48 percent (Brazil) percent (in Mexico the 
wealth share is 36 percent). For Brazil, Chile and Colombia the corresponding 
income share is in the range of 20 to 33 percent using tax data although the 
range is lower when using data from household surveys. 
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Table 7. Wealth shares 2015: Selected countries and regions
 Top
 10% 5% 1%
LAC    
Brazil 75.4 66.1 48
Chile 70.3 61.1 43.2
Colombia 66.8 54.8 34
Mexico 66 55.2 36
Other countries    
France 54.7 42.2 23.1
Germany 62.8 50.1 29.5
Russia 87.1 82 70.3
United Kingdom 54.1 42 23.2
Canada 57.7 45 25.1
United States 75.6 63 37.3
Regions    
Africa 78.6 68.4 47.2
Asia-Pacific 84.7 70.8 41.2
China 65.7 56.4 39.4
Europe 70 55.8 32.2
India 76.3 68.6 53
Latin America 72 61.8 42.7
North America 74.3 61.8 36.7
World 87.7 76.6 50
Source: Own elaboration based on Shorrocks et al.  (2015)
In European economies such as France, Germany and the UK, the wealth 
shares for the top 1 percent are in the range of 23-29 percent, lower than in the 
Latin American countries. In turn, the corresponding share in the United States 
is  39 percent, and the top one percent’s wealth share in Russia is 71 percent.11
11 It is worth noting that the Global Wealth Report own rating of the quality of the wealth data is higher 
for the US, Canada and European countries than for most Latin American countries, Russia and Africa. 
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5.3. the very weAlthy 
 There are different definitions for the super-wealthy. Forbes magazine pre-
sents, every year, a list of billionaires for over 70 countries (around 1,600 
people worldwide with net worth above one-billion dollars). An alternative, less 
stringent definition is provided by the World Ultra Wealth Report a publication 
prepared jointly by the consultancy Wealth-X and the UBS bank. This report 
defines as “ultra-high net worth individuals” (UHNW) as those with net assets 
above US$ 30 million. Globally they represent only 0.004 percent of the world 
adult population (around 211,000 people) but control near 13 percent of total 
wealth (29.8 trillion dollars). In contrast, in the base of the pyramid, 66 percent 
of the population (3.25 billion people) has a net worth that represents 13.8 
percent of total wealth. In the Latin American region, Mexico followed by Brazil 
and Argentina, the three countries with the largest population in the region, 
have the largest number of UHNW individuals. Worldwide the highest number 
of UHNW individuals are located in the United States.
tAble 8. worlD elite 2014: selecteD countries AnD regions
 
UHNW 
Population
UNHW Wealth 
US$ billion
 
UHNW Popu-
lation
UNHW Wealth 
US$ billion
LAC   Other Countries   
Brazil 4,225 820 United States 69,560 9,630
Mexico 3,470 460 Canada 5,305 635
Argentina 1,185 160 Germany 19,095 2,580
Colombia 670 85 United Kingdom 11,510 1,445
Chile 515 75 France 4,750 565
Peru 515 65 Russia 1,230 650
Venezuela 455 60 Spain 1,800 225
Ecuador 280 30 Denmark 825 95
Dominican R. 265 30 Japan 14,720 2,430
Guatemala 260 30 China 11,070 1,565
Bolivia 245 30 India 8,595 1,013
Honduras 225 30 Australia 3,580 440
Nicaragua 210 30 South Africa 835 112
Paraguay 190 25 Regions   
El Salvador 160 21 Asia 46,635 6,975
Uruguay 125 18 Africa 3,005 395
Panama 120 17 Europe 61,820 8,355
Puerto Rico 110 16 LAC 14,805 2,225
Costa Rica 100 14 North America 74,865 10,265
Cuba 45 6 World 211,275 29,725
Source: Own elaboration based on World Ultra Wealth Report, 2014.
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5.4. the miDDle clAss AnD the working clAss/poor. 
An important segment of the social structure is the “middle class” or some-
times called the “majority class”. Defining and measuring its size is not simple. 
Economists often adopt an income-based (or consumption-based) definition 
of the middle class and identify a positive relationship (often non-linear) with 
economic growth and a negative relation with inequality. In turn, sociologists 
use dimensions such as occupations, asset ownership, values, attitudes toward 
risk, and the search for upward social mobility to measure and/or identify the 
middle class. In terms of values and attitudes, middle class families often want 
stable jobs for their members, owning a house or property, having access to 
good education and health services for their children and living in a country 
with political stability and little insecurity (Solimano, 2014).
An important trend is the increased internal differentiation within the mid-
dle class. On the one hand, there is a thriving upper middle class segment 
composed by a brand of highly educated and well-connected managers and 
professionals such as lawyers, financial experts, economists, and technology 
experts working for banks, big corporations, independent professional firms 
and government. In contrast, a less prosperous segment of the middle class, 
composed by teachers, employees of ministries and public agencies, clerical 
workers, salespeople in retail stores may face stagnant wages and slim chances 
for economic progress in an increasingly segmented and elitist society.
 Regarding the working poor, the greater globalisation of capital than labor 
along with a set of factors already mentioned such as decline in union mem-
bership, labour saving technical change, immigration to rich countries have 
hampered the relative economic position of wage earners and diminished the 
political influence of the traditional working class. The bargaining power of 
workers affecting the distribution of productivity gains between capital and 
labour has weakened and there has been a steady decline in labour shares in 
national income in main economies such as the U.S, Germany, China along with 
other developing countries according to studies of the International Labour 
Office (ILO) (Stockhammer, 2013) and the NBER (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 
2013). The Latin American region has not been immune to these trends. 
5.5.   how lArge is the miDDle clAss in lAtin AmericA? 
A report produced by the World Bank (World Bank, 2012) attempted to 
measure the growth of the middle class in Latin America in the first decade of 
the 21st century. According to this report the middle class went up from 103 
million in 2003 to 152 million people in 2009/2010, or a 50 percent increase. 
In turn, a study of the OECD (Karas, 2010) puts the size of the middle class in 
Central and South America in 2009 in 181 million or 10 percent of the global 
middle class. The World Bank report adopted a definition of middle class that 
includes individuals earning between US$ 10 and US$ 50 per day and defines 
the “vulnerable class” (a segment between the poor and the middle class) as in-
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dividuals earning between US$ 4 and US$ 10 per day. It is estimated that near 
38 percent of the Latin American population is within this vulnerable segment 
(c. 2010). In Latin America (and the world in general, see table 9) the dominant 
dynamics of social mobility along the growth process is, in a first stage, moving 
from poverty to the “vulnerable class” and then, in a second stage,  to a middle 
class status. 
A recent study by the Pew Research Centre (2015) tracks the evolution 
of the different socio-economic segments between 2001 and 2011 both at 
regional and global levels. At global level, the share of the poor in total world 
population declines from 29 percent in 2001 to 15 percent in 2011 along with 
an increase in the share of the low income from 50 to 56 percent with the share 
of the middle class going-up from 7 percent to 13 percent of total population 
(see table 8). The story is that a majority of the world population continues to 
be either low income/poor and that, as indicated, the dominant transition is 
from poverty to vulnerability (or low income status) rather than a direct jump 
from poverty to middle incomes. Between 2001 and 2011, the expansion of 
the middle class was far stronger in South America than in Central America 
and the Caribbean. In fact, in South America, the share of the middle class in 
total population increased from 16 percent in 2001 to 27 percent in 2011 (the 
percent of the poor declined by 10 percentage points (p.p.) between these two 
years). In contrast, the increase in the share of the middle class in total popula-
tion was just of 2 percentage points from 19 percent to 21 percent in Central 
America and the Caribbean. At individual country level the main gainers were 
all South American countries: Argentina (17.5 p.p.), Ecuador (13.4 p.p.), Peru 
(10.9 p.p.) and Brazil (10.3 p.p.). In contrast, the share of the middle class 
increased very little or remained stagnant in El Salvador (0.9 p.p.), Guatemala 
(0.8 p.p.) and the Dominican Republic (0.1 p.p.). In Mexico the share of the 
middle class went up by 8.8 percent between 2001 and 2011 (table 10).
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tAble 10. the miDDle clAss in  selecteD lAtin AmericAn countries, 2001-2011 (percent of 
populAtion thAt is miDDle income)
Country 2001 2011 Change (2001/2011)
Argentina 15.0% 32.5% 17.5
Ecuador 7.7% 21.1% 13.4
Peru 14.0% 24.8% 10.9
Brazil 17.5% 27.8% 10.3
Colombia 11.2% 20.7% 9.6
Venezuela 20.2% 29.5% 9.3
Mexico 16.9% 25.7% 8.8
Chile 25.3% 33.8% 8.6
Costa Rica 25.6% 30.0% 4.4
Uruguay 30.1% 32.8% 2.7
Dominican Republic 25.1% 26.0% 0.9
Guatemala 18.3% 19.1% 0.8
El Salvador 18.0% 18.1% 0.1
Source: Own elaboration based on Pew Research Centre (2015).
The Global Wealth Report (Davis, Shorrocks and Lluberas, 2015b) has at-
tempted to measure the proportion of the adult population that belongs to the 
middle class through wealth measures and the ownership of assets rather than 
by income. Their definition of middle class status is the ownership of assets by 
an adult in the range of US$ 50,000 to US$ 500,000 (the measure is taken 
from the US in which the lower bound of US$ 50,000 represents two years of 
median earnings and US$ 500,000 is the cost of buying an annuity, at an age 
close to retirement, that yields a stream of income equivalent to the median 
wage for the reminder of their life). According to this wealth measure, the rela-
tive size of the middle class as percent of adult population is much smaller 
when measured by wealth than income. This is intuitive since less people has 
the economic resources to accumulate assets that satisfy the two conditions 
compared to less stringent incomes benchmarks; on the other hand, the con-
cept of middle class as a segment that cares for their long run economic securi-
ty is better approximated by their assets holdings than by measures of current 
income. At a regional level, the relative size of the Latin American middle class 
measured by wealth is 10.8 percent in 2015. Using the same wealth criteria, 
the size of the middle class in North America is 38.8 percent, in Europe 33.1 
percent and in Africa 3.3 percent. The Latin American country with the largest 
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middle class is Chile, 22.3 percent, followed by Mexico, 17.1 percent, Colom-
bia, 15.3 percent, Brazil, 8.3 percent and Argentina , 4 percent (this latter 
estimate is admittedly low)). 
6. concluDing remArks
This paper shows that when Gini coefficients and top income shares are 
calculated with tax –based data (less prone to underreporting at the top) the 
alleged decline in inequality in Latin America in the 2000s and early 2010s 
measured by household survey data has to be qualified and contested. Recent 
empirical studies using tax data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Uruguay reviewed in this paper show, generally, stable (rather than declin-
ing) top income shares in the 2005-2014 period for the top 10 percent and 
top 1 percent. In addition, when “corrected” Gini coefficients using tax data for 
the top 10/top 1 percent, instead of household survey data, the value of the 
Gini goes up by several percentage points. 
New net wealth data for a large number of countries, including Latin Amer-
ica, show much higher wealth inequality than income inequality across coun-
tries. The wealth-Gini is higher than the income-Gini, the top wealth shares are 
higher than the corresponding top income shares and the relative size of the 
middle class when using wealth criteria to define it is much smaller than when 
evaluated using income criteria.  This holds for Latin American countries and 
other economies outside this region. 
Our analysis of the social structure in Latin America shows that economic 
elites capture a very significant proportion of national income and personal 
wealth; these shares tend to be greater than in advanced economies but lower 
than in very unequal countries such as South Africa (Solimano, 2016). In turn, 
most of the growth of the middle class between 2001 and 2011, following a 
period of more rapid growth, was concentrated in South American countries 
and Mexico. In contrast, over the same period the increase in the size of the 
middle class in Central America and the Caribbean nations was small. Finally, 
although in the 2000s global poverty and Latin American poverty both de-
clined the dominant transition was from poverty to vulnerability rather than a 
direct jump from being poor to a genuine middle class status.  
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